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NOTES
in favor of Ducros; and it should be remembered that the existence of
Ducros abolishes the artificial, but crucial, tax distinctions between cross-
purchase and stock redemption plans. The most important lesson to be
learned from the foregoing is that great care must be exercised when life
insurance is utilized to fund stock purchase agreements in order that
adverse tax consequences may be avoided. The tax planner who deter-
mines to use the Ducros rationale may be charting a course which leads
to litigation and possibly additional tax liability. Where a Ducros situa-
tion is involved, caution should be the keynote, as it is very difficult to
predict the final determination of the issue.
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY ACTIONS
IN INDIANA
Traditionally, the right of appeal from decisions of administrative
officials, boards or agencies is a matter of legislative discretion to be
given or withheld as the legislature sees fit; there is no vested right of
appeal.1 The legislature may not only declare what questions may be
tried or reviewed on appeal, to what tribunal the appeal may proceed and
where the appeal shall stop, but it also may deny any appeal whatsoever.2
Therefore, if no statutory procedure is provided, no review is available,3
unless the extraordinary prerogative writs4 are applicable. The use of
the extraordinary writs as a method of review is highly complicated and
often unsatisfactory.' They are incomplete and overlapping, and taken
1. Ruddick v. City of Columbus, 183 Ind. 21, 108 N.E. 106 (1915) (proceeding
through common council to extend or open certain streets) ; Collins v. Laybold, 182 Ind.
126, 104 N.E. 971 (1914) (drainage proceedings); Bemis v. Guirl Drainage Co., 182
Ind. 36, 105 N.E. 496 (1914); Stockton v. Yeoman, 179 Ind. 61, 100 N.E. 2 (1913)
(public highway improvement proceedings).
2. Bemis v. Guirl Drainage Co., supra note 1.
3. In re Petition to Transfer Appeals, 202 Ind. 365, 174 N.E. 812 (1931); State
Board v. Ort, 84 Ind. App. 260, 151 N.E. 31 (1925) ; Cushman v. Hussey, 187 Ind. 228,
118 N.E. 816 (1917) ; Farley v. Hamilton Co., 126 Ind. 468, 26 N.E. 174 (1890) ; Sims
v. Monroe Co., 39 Ind. 40 (1872).
4. Mandamus: IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-2201-8808, (Bums 1946); Prohibition:
IND. ANN. STAT. §3-2006-2007 (Burns 1946) ; Quo Warranto (Information) : IND. ANN.
STAT. § 3-2001-2004 (Burns 1946); Injunction: IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-2101-2120
(Burns 1946). Reference to the extraordinary writs is made at this point for back-
ground purposes only. For a complete historical background of the use of the various
writs and a thorough discussion of their use and function in the field of judicial review,
see Note, Appellate Review by Extraordinary Writ in Indiana, 33 IND. L. J. 431 (1958).
See also, Fuchs, Judicial Control of Administrative Agencies in Indiana, I, 28 IND. L. J.
1, 17-27 (1952).
5. The use of extraordinary remedies as a means of judicial review has not escaped
criticism. See DAvis, ADI NiSTRATrE LAW § 24.01 (1958): "An imaginary system
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together do not provide a complete code of judicial review. These writs
are granted only in the discretion of the court after it first determines
it has the jurisdiction to take the case; also they are not applicable if
there are adequate statutory remedies available.6 These fine distinctions
are often not brought home to the litigant until after an unsuccessful and
time-consuming appeal from an adverse ruling on the writ proceeding?!
Statutory appeals, the litigant's only alternate method of review, may
be equally restrictive. The courts will not accept review if they interpret
the statute to give the decision of the agency a preclusive effect.8 Ad-
ministrative decisions can be collaterally attacked by injunction only for
want of jurisdiction.' If a statutory method of review or appeal is pro-
vided, then the courts insist upon a strict and exclusive compliance with
the statutory procedure.'" The general statutes relating to civil procedure
cannot be resorted to for the purpose of extending or limiting the pro-
visions of a statutory review."
THE WARREN HOLDING
Then in 1940 the Indiana Supreme Court in Warren v. Indiana Bell
Telephone Co. 2 extended reviewability in a situation where a limited ap-
peal had been provided by statute.," The statute in question vested exclu-
cunningly planned for the evil purpose of thwarting justice and maximizing fruitless
litigation would copy the major features of the extraordinary remedies."
6. See Note, 33 IND. L. J. 431, 432-433 (1958).
7. Supra Note 6.
8. For a discussion of the constitutionality of an Act which makes no provision
for an appeal from agency action see Note Constitutional Law-Appeals From Admini-
strative Tribunals, 15' IND. L. J. 579 (1939-40). Financial Aid Corp. v. Wallace, 216
Ind. 114, 122, 23 N.E.2d 472 (1939) : "Whether an act expressly provides an appeal is of
no consequence. If an administrative officer undertakes to perform an unauthorized act,
an action will lie in court enjoining, prohibiting or mandating him in the performance
of administrative acts."
9. City of Peru v. State ex rel. McGuire, 210 Ind. 668, 199 N.E. 151 (1935);
Hyde v. Board of Comm'rs of Wells County, 209 Ind. 245, 198 N.E. 333 (1935) ; Pedvn
v. Board of Review of Cass County, 208 Ind. 215, 195 N.E. 87 (1935); Felthoff v.
Richards, 203 Ind. 637, 180 N.E. 596 (1932); in re Northwestern Indiana Tel. Co.,
201 Ind. 667, 171 N.E. 65 (1930).
10. Board of Comm'rs of Marion County v. Steele, 103 Ind. App. 51, 5 N.E.2d 135
(1936) (proceedings under drainage act).
11. Id. at 54. Partly responsible for this rigid and narrow viewpoint was the fact
that the term "decision" as used in the civil procedure statutes providing for appeals
was held to refer only to judicial decisions, meaning decisions involving a judicial act
and not purely ministerial decisions or administrative acts. Ross v. Becker, 169 Ind. 166,
81 N.E. 478 (1907) ; In re Northwestern Indiana Tel. Co., 201 Ind. 667, 171 N.E. 65
(1930); Collins v. Laybold, 182 Ind. 126, 104 N.E. 971 (1914); Potts v. Bennett, 140
Ind. 71, 39 N.E. 518 (1895).
12. 217 Ind. 93, 26 N.E.2d 399 (1940) (workmen's compensation case originating
before Industrial Board of Indiana).
13. IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-1512 (Burns 1933) : "An award by the full [industrial]
board shall be conclusive and binding as to all questions of fact, but either party to the
dispute may, within thirty (30) days from the date of such award, appeal to the Appellate
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sive jurisdiction to review Industrial Board proceedings in the Appellate
Court, but did not contain any procedure for a further review to the
Supreme Court. However, the Supreme Court took the appeal in the
WVarren case. It reversed its former position that there was no right of
transfer, under supreme court rules, of workmen's compensation cases
from the appellate court to the Supreme Court 4 and that the determina-
tion of the appellate court was final in such cases,'" holding that transfer
of the case was allowed under the supreme court rules.'"
The court, in Warren, treated appeals from administrative agencies
as newly-instituted judicial actions at the appellate court level"--not as
mere continuations of the administrative proceedings'--and, therefore,
subject to the constitutional principle that the "courts shall be open; and
every man, for injury done to him in his person, property or reputation
shall have remedy by due course of law.""
Court for errors of law under the same terms and conditions as govern appeals in ordinary
civil actions."
14. Kingan & Co. v. Ossam, 190 Ind. 554, 131 N.E. 81 (1921).
15. The court's language in the Kingan case, supra note 14, was quite strong.
It was there held that the general statute governing the transfer of cases from the
Appellate Court to the Supreme Court "muse' give way to the Compensation Act, which
was special in nature and which indicated by its language that no transfer in cases arising
thereunder was contemplated.
16. The reasoning given in support of such action was that an "appellant may not
be denied his right to present his case to the court of last resort for review because
the Legislature has not provided a means for bringing it there." 217 Ind. 93, 114-5.
17. The exact language of the Warren decision, so oft-quoted, is: "Strictly speaking,
there is no such thing as an appeal from an administrative agency. It is correct to say
that the orders of an administrative body are subject to judicial review; and that they
must be so to meet the requirements of due process." 217 Ind. 93, 105. This language
is still followed more than 20 years later. See Ball Brothers Co. v. Review Board of
Indiana Emp. Sec. Div., 167 N.E.2d 469 (Ind. 1960) ; Sizemore v. Public Service Com-
mission, 167 N.E.2d 343 (Ind. 1960); Martin v. Indianapolis Water Co., 162 N.E.2d
709 (Ind. App. 1959); Graver Tank Manufacturing Co. v. Maher, 238 Ind. 226, 150
N.E.2d 254 (1958). An assignment of errors in statutory appeal from order of Public
Service Commission is an initial pleading in the Appellate Court. Martin v. Indianapolis
Water Co., supra.
18. But see Square Deal Co. v. O'Neal, 225 Ind. 49, 72 N.E.2d 654 (1947), where
the Supreme Court concluded, notwithstanding the route provided by the Warren case,
that the legislature itself had provided a procedure for transferring workmen's com-
pensation cases from the Appellate to the Supreme Court.
19. CoNsTITuTION OF INDIANA, Article 1, § 12. Subsequent cases have followed
the Warren theory in holding that the General Assembly, by enacting a provision in the
statute providing that there shall be no appeal from such judgment, could not take from
the Supreme Court its constitutional appellate jurisdiction: Board of Medical Registration
and Examination v. Moore, 224 Ind. 621, 70 N.E.2d 354 (1947); Joseph E. Seagram
& Sons, Inc. v. Board of Conm'rs, 220 Ind. 604, 45 N.E.2d 491 (1943). The so-called
"inherent right to review" doctrine enunciated in the Warren case has even been
extended by the courts to non-administrative situations. See State ex rel. White v.
Hilgemann, Judge, 218 Ind. 572, 34 N.E.2d 129 (1941) (involving a first degree murder
conviction). The Supreme Court, outdoing itself to be sure "due process" was allowed,
used the Warren case as its basis for ordering the trial court to appoint competent
counsel to handle relator's pauper appeal, stating: "In Warren v. Indiana Telephone
C'o, .... it wa concluded . .. tlat the ConstitptiQn of Indiana guarantees an absolute
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At this point in order to fully discuss the views taken by the Indiana
courts in reconciling the Warren holding with the statutes relating to ap-
peals from" administrative orders, it may be helpful to categorize those
statutes generally as follows:2 (1) those which allow an appeal but
provide a definite limited procedure which must be followed or all rights
of recourse to the courts2 shall terminate;22 and (2) those statutes which
initially preclude review either beyond the trial court or agency level.23
riqht to a review by this court; that the legislature has the right to regulate and provide
procedure for obtaining a review, but not to curtail or deny the right. Review has been
made available by the statutory appeal, but the right to review is available in all cases,
and where the statutory appeal is inadequate, the writ of error or some other appropriate
means may be resorted to." Id. at 575. (Emphasis added). It is questionable that the
Wfarren doctrine, as originally expounded, was meant to extend this far.
20. Unfortunately, these classifications overlap; more than one type of limitation
or preclusion may be found in a given special proceeding statute. For example, IND. ANN.
STAT. § 48-4501 (Burns 1950) (appeals from council or city boards decisions). Section
1 of the Act provides a complaint must be filed with a superior or circuit court within
30 days from the date of the action or decision complained of. Section 5 specifically sets
forth that the order and judgment of the trial court (as provided in Section 1) shall
be final and conclusive upon all parties and no appeal shall lie therefrom except upon
questions affecting solely the jurisdiction of the court In addition, Section 6 provides
that any such appeal beyond the trial court level is to be governed by the provisions of
the civil code, except that it shall be fully perfected within 60 days from the final ruling
or action of the trial court and shall be taken directly to the Supreme Court.
21. The use of the words "court" or "trial court" here necessarily includes the
Appellate Court in its capacity to initially review an order of an administrative agency
directed by statute to its jurisdiction. Thus, in this capacity, it sits in the same relation
as a circuit or superior court sits in relation to initial proceedings for review from the
administrative orders directed by statute to its jurisdiction.
22. E.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 63-3001-3024 (Burns 1951) (Administrative Ad-
judication and Court Review Act). This act is applicable to all state agencies except
those specifically excluded. IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-4501-4509 (Burns 1950) (provides
procedure for appeals otherwise allowable by law from city councils or boards). These
provide that an appeal must be taken from the circuit or superior court where initial
"review" was had directly to the Supreme Court of Indiana within a shorter time limit
than is provided by the Supreme Court's own rules. Another type of procedural restriction
is the requirement that no appeal shall lie from the trial court's judgment except upon
questions affecting solely the jurisdiction of the court. IND. ANN. STAT. §48-4505 (Burns
1950). In some instances the restrictions are upon the parties. IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-4608
(Burns 1950) (Levees and Drains). This statute provides that an appeal may be taken
only by any person who Previously remonstrated against the assessments made by the
Board of Public Works. The Public Service Commission Act, IND. ANN. STAT. § 54-443
(Burns Supp. 1961) provides that an appeal may be taken only by parties adversely
affected by any final decision of the Commission and § 54-444 of the same statute pro-
vides that if a petition for rehearing is filed with the Commission by any party to the
proceeding before the Commission, the right to appeal shall terminate 30 days after the
Commission's ruling on such petition for rehearing.
23. E.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-2111 (Burns 1950) provides for an appeal from
the Board of Public Works to the circuit or superior court, whose decision and judgment
shall be final and conclusive upon all parties thereto and no further appeal shall be taken.
To the same effect are: IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-6105 (Burns 1950) (appeal from actions
of Board of Public Safety or Board of Metropolitan Police Commissioners) ; IND. ANN.
STAT. § 48-8515 (Burns 1950) (appeal from action of the Redevelopment Commis-
sioners); IND. ANN. STAT. § 63-214 (Burns 1951) (appeal from decision of Indiana
Athletic Commission) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-4609 (Burns 1950) (appeal from assess-
ments of Board of Public Works). Another type of preclusive statute provides the
This note concentrates on the impact of the Warren case upon situations
arising under the foregoing types of statutes. The Warren decision has
been interpreted to permit an appeal from an administrative decision in
many cases in which the statutory procedures have not been followed and
in many cases in which no statutory review has been made available. If
the Indiana courts are thus providing a form of "constitutional" judicial
review of agency actions on the basis of the Warren case as a matter of
right and in spite of statutory restrictions, then traditional judicial review
doctrines may no longer be controlling in Indiana.
(1) Statutory Procedures Not Followed
If the special statutory procedure had not been strictly complied with,
the pre-Warren holdings would have automatically precluded further re-
view, except in those instances when a question of the constitutionality
of a statute or the jurisdiction of the court was raised in the trial court.24
This view, although not completely superseded,25 can no longer be re-
garded as absolute. Using Warren as the basis for their decision in most
cases, the Indiana courts now tend to overlook failures of strict compli-
ance with procedures afforded by the special review statutes. Abandon-
ment of the old rule is most evident in those cases in which the appellant
has not complied with the time requirements or limitations in the special
statute."0 For example, in Hansen v. Town of Highland," the Supreme
decision of the administrative official or body is "final" and no appeal shall lie therefrom.
For example, IND. ANN. STAT. § 64-314 (Burns 1951) provides the action of the State
Board of Tax Commissioners shall be final and conclusive upon appeals to it by municipal
corporations or board of county commissioners. To the same effect is § 64-1331 (appeals
by the taxpayers) and § 64-1332 (appeals from municipal bond issues).
24. City of Elkhart v. Misner, 211 Ind. 20, 24-25, 5 N.E.2d 501 (1936) : "When
either the question of constitutionality of an act or the jurisdiction of the court is pre-
sented by the issues to the trial court, it does not lie within the power or authority
delegated to the legislative branch of the state government to declare that such questions
may not be reviewed on appeal to this court."
25. Ballman v. Duffecy, 230 Ind. 220, 102 N.E.2d 646 (1952) (statutory certiorari
proceeding filed pursuant to IND. ANN. STAT. § 53-783 (Burns 1951) to review a
decision of the Board of Zoning Appeals of City of Indianapolis). The appeal was
dismissed because it was not presented to the court within 30 days after the entry of
the Board's final decision. The court held that a failure to comply with the statute was
jurisdictional and that it did not, therefore, acquire jurisdiction of the parties or subject
matter of the case. See also White v. Board of Medical Registration & Examination, 235
Ind. 572, 134 N.E.2d 566 (1956) (appeal dismissed because of failure to file petition
for review within 15-day limitation of the Administrative Adjudication and Court
Review Act).
26. E.g., Board of Zoning Appeals v. School City of Mishawaka, 127 Ind. App. 683,
145 N.E.2d 302 (1957). Here an argument that a superior court had no jurisdiction,
because of a failure to give the Board of Zoning Appeals twenty days to show cause why
a writ of certiorari should not issue as provided by the special statute, was held invalid
on the ground that a failure to comply with the statutory requirements does not deprive
the court of jurisdiction of the subject matter which the statute expressly confers on it.
27. 237 Ind. 516, 147 N.E.2d 221 (1958) (proceedings before Board of Metropolitan
NOTES 263
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Court applied its own 90-day rule in allowing an appeal to be taken in the
face of statutory language requiring the petitioner to file his transcript
and assignment of errors within sixty days." A later case defended the
supremacy of the court's own rules over the statutory time limit by clas-
sifying the time, place and method of doing an act in court as a question
of procedure." According to this theory then, any conflict in procedure
between the special statute and the supreme court rules would be resolved
in favor of the rules. Thus if appeals from administrative agencies are
timely filed under the supreme court rules governing regular civil pro-
cedure, the court is apparently prepared to allow the appeal even though
it is untimely under the special statute. But an unreasonable filing, 175
days after rendition of the administrative order, still comes too late."0
The Warren decision has been utilized by the Indiana courts not only
to indicate that lateness in filing an appeal under a special statute will not
be fatal, but also as the basis for findings that statutory procedures may
not cut off the availability of the courts. Thus, when a question was
presented, upon the filing of a motion for a new trial by remonstrators,
that the special statute did not contemplate such a pleading, the court held
that in the absence of any provision in the special act to the contrary, the
court could properly resort to the general procedure provided for the
government of the courts wherein jurisdiction was vested.3' A more
radical departure from the traditional "follow-the-procedure" doctrine
was made in Mann v. City of Terre Haute.2  In that case the Supreme
Police Commissioners). The town filed a motion to dismiss the attempted appeal on the
ground that appellant's transcript was not filed within the 60-day time limit set up in
IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-4501 (Burns 1950) governing appeals from the Board.
28. The court in the Hansen case, supra note 27, based its reasoning upon City of
Michigan City v. Williamson, 217 Ind. 598, 28 N.E.2d 961 (1940); City of Michigan
City v. State ex rel. Seidler, 211 Ind. 586, 5 N.E.2d 968 (1937), in which cases the court
had held the supreme court rule time limitation applied to the general appeal statutes,
and since the town had failed to cite any cases during the 24 years since the 1933 Act
where the 60-day limitation provided therein had been applied, the court was not now
inclined to interpret the statute so as to fix a shorter limitation for appeals, particularly
in the interest of not "misleading" litigants.
29. State v. Gibson Circuit Court, 239 Ind. 394, 157 N.E.2d 475 (1959) (involving
remonstrances against a levee proceeding).
30. Gulick v. Marion Circuit Court, 230 Ind. 232, 102 N.E.2d 762 (1952) (attempt
to appeal from judgment of circuit court affirming determination of Indiana State
Personnel Board).
31. State ex rel. Barner v. White Circuit Court, 237 Ind. 443, 147 N.E.2d 10 (1958).
32. 163 N.E.2d 577 (Ind. 1960). This was an action by the taxpayers to enjoin the
city from issuing revenue bonds to finance sewage treatment and disposal plant con-
struction in an effort to comply with an order of the Stream Pollution Control Board.
Appellants claimed the act creating the above board was unconstitutional in that it con-
tained no provision giving taxpayers and property owners interested in such projects
any statutory proceeding for judicial review as to the unreasonableness or desirability
of the proposed public works. However, in Southport Board of Zoning Appeals v.
Southside Ready Mix Concrete, 176 N.E.2d 112, (Ind. 1961), the court did not apply
264
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Court accepted review of a proceeding presented by way of an action for
injunction even though the appeal under the statutory procedure had not
been perfected at all. On the basis of the Warren case, the court flatly
stated that a review by way of a proceeding in equity asking for an in-
junction against the alleged erroneous action of the board, commission
or governmental corporation could be had whenever the legislature failed
to provide a sufficiently broad statutory remedy of appeal. Clearly the
Mann case casts doubt upon the traditional theory that the special pro-
cedure must be followed at least to the extent of the remedy made avail-
able by statute before resort is made to any common law or equitable
remedy."
However, the foregoing does not mean that the court will go so far
as to disturb the non-procedural rules governing judicial intervention.
The courts will still respect the integrity of the administrative process
until it is completed. Thus, if the administrative decision appealed from
is merely one making tentative and preliminary recommendations the
courts are without jurisdiction to review. 4 Those decisions are not bind-
ing upon anyone; final action must still be taken by some other body.
On the other hand, if it can be shown that the order appealed from is an
initial integral step in a regulatory scheme, the Supreme Court has held
that appellant is not required to await a further regulatory order before
contesting the agency's jurisdiction.35 Also the court will not intervene
except at the behest of a litigant with an interest in the proceeding, i.e. he
must have the required standing to sue under the applicable statute. For
example, an attempted appeal from a public service commission water rate
order was dismissed because appellants had not shown they were persons
"adversely affected" by a final decision of the commission as provided by
the Mann doctrine when confronted with a statute which was silent as to any judicial
review of, or appeal from, the authority of the Town Engineer to issue building permits.
The court distinguished between the two situations on the ground that in the Southport
case there was no allegation of any arbitrary, illegal or erroneous action on the part of
the administrative official. Therefore the board of zoning appeals was enjoined from
asserting any jurisdiction to review the issuance of a building permit for a construction
project.
33. The traditional "follow-the-statute" first doctrine is well laid out in Public
Serv. Comm'n v. City of Indianapolis, 235 Ind. 70, 131 N.E.2d 308 (1956). Even when
the jurisdiction of the administrative agency is challenged, it has been held that the
reviewing court must withhold its action until the administrative remedies have been
exhausted. City of East Chicago v. Sinclair Refining Co., 232 Ind. 295, 111 N.E.2d 459(1953).
34. Droege v. St. Joseph County Plan Comm'n, 175 N.E.2d 432 (Ind. App. 1961);
McGraw v. Marion County Plan Comm'n, 174 N.E.2d 757 (Ind. App. 1961); Wright v.
Marion County Plan Comm'n, 163 N.E.2d 259 (Ind. App. 1960).
35. Boone County REMC v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 129 Ind. App. 175, 155 N.E.2d
149 (1958).
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statute. 6 Further, the courts are hesitant to accept review when faced
with the possibility that if the statutory procedure is not strictly followed
it will result in unfairness to third parties in terms of venue" or notice."
There seems to be little ground for reconciling the Mann decision
with the above decisions requiring statutory procedures to be followed.
If the Mann decision is interpreted as permitting resort to the court
before the statutory procedures have been exhausted, it would seem to vio-
late the order of appeal just as much as a case in which an appeal was
accepted from an intermediate order. The distinction may be that, in
accepting the court's proposition that statutes may not limit its jurisdic-
tion, failure to exhaust an inadequate procedure will not be required.
This view would be in keeping with those cases which do not require
exhaustion of an administrative procedure when it is likewise futile or
incomplete. A later case, Bole v. Civil City of Ligonier,39 would seem to
go a step further. In that case the court allowed a discharged policeman
to use a common law remedial action in spite of the procedure provided in
the special statute relating to appeals from the decisions of the board of
safety; the reasoning given was that a special statute did not render
unavailable a plaintiff's existing common-law rights and remedies.
(2) Preclusive Statutes
So far we have concentrated upon the effect of the Warren decision
in those situations involving statutes which afford some sort of an appeal,
even though the litigants have not perfected their appeals under the statu-
tory procedures. Quite a different problem arises when review is sought
of administrative actions under statutes attempting to preclude review.
One such statute provides an appeal to an inferior court, but attempts to
limit a further appeal by providing the lower court's decision shall be
final.4" This is the classic Warren situation, and the courts have not
permitted the statute to so limit the court's constitutional jurisdiction.
36. Martin v. Indianapolis Water Co., 162 N.E.2d 709 (Ind. App. 1959).
37. State ex rel. Marion County Plan Comm'n v. Marion Superior Court, 235 Ind.
607, 136 N.E.2d 616 (1956). The statute provided that decisions of the plan commis-
sion could be reviewed by statutory certiorari proceedings filed in the circuit court.
Suit had been filed in the superior court. The Supreme Court found that a suit filed
in the wrong court was not within the statutory remedy and therefore the superior court
was without jurisdiction in this case.
38. Kupfer v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Indianapolis, 162 N.E.2d 110 (Ind. App.
1959). The zoning statute provided that when statutory certiorari proceedings were
filed, notice was to be served by the sheriff upon the adverse party. In this case service
was made by mailing a copy of the pleading to the attorney for the party defendant. The
court held this was inadequate procedure under the zoning act; the adverse party had
to be served personally.
39. 174 N.E.2d 412 (Ind. App. 1961).
40. See note 23 supra.
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One approach used by the courts in overriding this statutory limitation
has been that the General Assembly is without power to take from the
Supreme Court its constitutional appellate jurisdiction.4' The Hansen42
case disposed of such statutory restrictions43 on the ground that statutes
of this nature shall be of no effect and that litigants have a constitutional
right to a further review on the basis of the Warren case. The foregoing
would seem to indicate the courts consider their constitutional appellate
jurisdiction sufficiently broad to include even those situations in which
their jurisdiction has been denied by the legislature.
A major problem arises however, with the second type of statute
which attempts to give a preclusive effect to the administrative determina-
tion."' Elsewhere, statutory preclusions of this kind have been re-
spected.4" But the Indiana courts, following the Warren decision, have
denied a preclusive effect by permitting recourse to prerogative writ
procedures in spite of the statutory foreclosure. For example, in State
ex rel. Smitherman v. Davis46 an action in mandamus was allowed to com-
pel school trustees to transfer school pupils from one school system to
another even though the statute provided the decision of the county su-
perintendent of schools was final.47 The court found that the nature of
the discretionary act in Smitherman directly and substantially affected
the lives and property of the public. In this case the common law writ
would have been available on orthodox grounds but for the statutory
restrictions. Discretionary acts of public officials, which directly and
substantially affect the lives and property of the public have always been
subject to review when the action of such officials is alleged to be fraud-
41. An earlier indication of this trend can be found in City of South Bend v. Whit-
comb & Keller, 224 Ind. 99, 64N.E.2d 580 (1946) (appeal from assessments of benefits
and damages by board of public works) ; Prunk v. Indianapolis Redevelopment Comm'n,
228 Ind. 579, 93 N.E.2d 171 (1950) (proceedings under the Redevelopment Act of 1945).
42. Hansen v. Town of Highland, 237 Ind. 516, 147 N.E.2d 221 (1958).
43. IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-6105 (Burns 1950) which provides the decision of a
trial court with respect to an appeal from a board of metropolitan police commissioners
shall be final.
44. See note 23 supra.
45. 3 DAvis, ADmINISTRATm LAW § 28.20 (1958) and cases cited.
46. 238 Ind. 563, 151 N.E.2d 495 (1958).
47. The statute under attack here is an excellent example of legislative stubborn-
ness. IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-3705 (Burns 1948). Prior to 1959, the Act provided that
if an order of transfer be denied, an appeal could be taken to the county superintendent
of schools, whose decision was to be final. The Act was amended in 1959 (and altered
slightly in 1961) so it now provides that an appeal can be taken from an adverse ruling
of the county superintendent of schools (within 30 days) to the Commission on General
Education of the Indiana State Board of Education, whose decision shall be final. This
statute is extremely interesting in that the amendments of 1959 and 1961 were made
after the Supreme Court's decision in State ex rel. Smitherman v. Davis, note 45 supra,
that the legislature cannot make the decision of an administrative officer final.
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ulent, arbitrary or capricious.4" Apparently, this is the distinguishing
line between the type of non-reviewability upheld in attempted appeals
from decisions of the Alcoholic Beverage Commission concerning liquor
or beer permits." In those cases the court has found an absolute lack of
property right in such permits expressly stated in the statute."0 Thus, if
the court fails to find a substantive right which it can protect, as in the
alcoholic beverage license cases, it may find preclusion; in cases like
Smitherman where it finds a protected interest, it will use the extraordi-
nary writs to provide peripheral review in spite of the statute.
CONCLUSION
The Indiana courts since the Warren case appear to have modified
the ordinary doctrines of judicial review of administrative actions. Thus
judicial review in Indiana no longer seems dependent on explicit statutory
provisions or on the availability of one of the extraordinary writs. Statu-
tory procedures, even though not followed, have not always been allowed
by the courts to prevent judicial intervention. While the court apparently
has reserved the power to regulate its own jurisdiction by disregarding
defects in the perfection of individual appeals, it has not always been
consistent in doing so. A major factor in the determination by the
courts as to whether or not to accept review seems to be the nature of the
rights affected. Also the courts have permitted resort to actions in equity
and the extraordinary writs even though the words of the statute could
well have been interpreted to make the action of the administrative agency
final. These decisions, based on the Warren holding that judicial review
of agency action is a matter of "constitutional right," appear to have
accomplished what other courts have accomplished by way of statutory
48. Columbia Properties v. State Board of Tax Comm'rs, 232 Ind. 262, 111 N.E.2d
891, appeal dismissed and cert. denied 346 U.S. 879 (1953) ; Phillips v. Officials of City
of Valparaiso, 233 Ind. 414, 118 N.E.2d 398 (1954) ; Slentz v. City of Fort Wayne, 233
Ind. 226, 118 N.E.2d 484 (1954) ; Smith v. Lippman, 222 Ind. 261, 53 N.E.2d 157 (1944);
Coleman v. City of Gary, 220 Ind. 446, 44 N.E.2d 101 (1942).
49. State ex rel. Alcoholic Beverage Commission v. Superior Court Vanderburgh
County, 229 Ind. 483, 99 N.E.2d 247 (1951) ; State ex rel. Zeller v. Montgomery Circuit
Court, 223 Ind. 476, 62 N.E.2d 149 (1945).
50. IND. ANN. STAT. § 12-443 (Burns 1956) : "No person shall be deemed to have
any property right in any . . . beer . . . liquor . . . permit, nor shall said permit itself
or the enjoyment thereof be considered a property right. All . . . permits . . . shall
be issued, suspended or revoked in the absolute discretion and judgment of the com-
mission. No court shall have jurisdiction of any action, either at law or in equity, to
compel the issuance of any such permit, or to revoke, annul, suspend or enjoin any action,
ruling, finding or order of the commission suspending or revoking any such permit, and
the consent of the sovereign state of Indiana is hereby expressly withdrawn and denied
in any such action, either at law or in equity."
NOTES
interpretation,"1 although the Indiana cases still go further than those in
most jurisdictions. However, the scope of review afforded does not
appear to have been changed perceptively by the Warren case and its suc-
cessors ;52 the availability of review has been merely liberalized. To the
extent this trend seems to overcome the prior deficiencies in the field of
availability of judicial review of administrative actions, it perhaps
amounts to a reform in that area. The trend thus indicated in the deci-
sions may be good insofar as it implements judicial control, but it throws
the status of many statutes in doubt.
51. Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958), noted 73 HARv. L. REv. 217 (1959).
See also Note, 36 IwD. L.J. 484 (Summer 1961).
52. Even in Mann v. City of Terre Haute, 163 N.E.2d 577, 579-580 (Ind. 1960),
the court made this quite clear, after citing the Warren case, by its use of the following
language: "This does not mean the courts will review the administrative action of any
board, commission or governmental corporation for the purpose of substituting its opinion
or judgment for that of the board in discretionary inatters within the jurisdiction of such
a); administrative body. The courts will, however, review the proceedings to determine
whether procedural requirements have been followed and if there is any substantial evi-
dence to support the finding and order of such a board. The courts will also review the
proceedings to determine whether or not the order of the board, its judgment or finding,
is fraudulent, unreasonable or arbitrary, if requested." (Emphasis added.)
EDITOR'S NOTE
The Note, "Rights of Federal Government Personnel Under the
Copyright Act," 37 Indiana Law Journal 105 (1961), has been awarded
third prize in the National Nathan R. Burkan Memorial Competition.
The note will be reprinted in ASCAP Copyright Law Symposium Num-
ber 12 which will be published by Columbia University Press.
